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‘The law touches us but here and there, 
and now and then’: 
Edmund Burke, law, and legal theory1
Seán Patrick Donlan
University of Limerick
Manners are of more importance than laws. Upon them, in a great measure, the
laws depend. The law touches us but here and there, and now and then. Manners
are what vex or soothe, corrupt or purify, exalt or debase, barbarize or refine us, by
a constant, steady, uniform, insensible operation, like that of the air we breathe in.
They give their whole form and colour to our lives. According to their quality, they
aid morals, they supply them, or they totally destroy them.
E Burke, Letters on a regicide peace, Indianapolis, Liberty Fund Press, 1999
[1795-7], 129.
Edmund Burke’s training in, knowledge of, and appreciation for, law is
generally recognised. Indeed, as RB McDowell has written, while Burke
may, during short bouts of irritation, have impulsively expressed intense
exasperation with lawyers, their practices, procedures and prejudices, [but
he] nevertheless remained convinced that the law, with all its limitations,
must be regarded with reverence and that lawyers, with all their faults,
performed functions of the utmost value to the community.2
1 This paper is an extended version of SP Donlan, ‘Burke on law and legal theory’ for C Insole and
D Dwan (eds), The Cambridge companion to Edmund Burke (forthcoming, Cambridge University
Press, 2012). Readers will find additional information in the notes there.
2 McDowell, R.B. ‘Edmund Burke and the law’ in D.S. Greer and N.M. Dawson (eds.), Mysteries
and solutions in Irish legal history: Irish Legal History Society and other papers, 1996-1999,
Dublin, Four Courts Press, 2001, 113.
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But the Irishman’s extensive use of legal language obscures how little he
actually said or wrote about legal theory. As in other areas, the numerous
volumes of Burke’s correspondence, writings, and speeches, cannot
provide us with a clear and rigorous theory. His comments on the law typi-
cally took place in specific and complex, rapidly changing, political contro-
versies: eg, the exclusion of John Wilkes from Parliament, the American
war, the impeachment of Warren Hastings, the regency crisis of 1788-9, or
the revolution in France. These reflections are often little more than the
obiter dicta of political and public debates. They should not be confused
with more formal treatise or commentaries on the laws. Instead of
proscribing our interpretations to narrow limits, Burke’s texts have invited
considerable special pleading. This cannot absolve commentators from
reasonable evidentiary demands and coherence, but considerable interpre-
tive liberties are inevitable. Burke’s words, whether in private correspond-
ence or public commentary, require difficult choices to be made between
literal and liberal interpretations, between letter and spirit. There are inev-
itably lacunae to be filled and reconstructed. Interpretive prejudices may be
unavoidable. As a result, ‘Rescuing Burke’ from early interpretations is an
ongoing affair.
As with English nationalists and political conservatives, Anglo-American
lawyers have been quick to claim Burke as their own and to employ him in
present debates. If these readings may be valuable in themselves, whatever
their historical accuracy, they reflect at least two related problems. The first
is an historiographical failure to appreciate the circumstances in which
Burke wrote. The second is the hermeneutic problem of interpreting words
from these past circumstances for present purposes. This approach seems
quite foreign to Burke’s careful attention to context. It is, however, all too
common for lawyers. Treated, insofar as is possible, in their own terms,
Burke’s texts suggest a picture that is often at odds with common assump-
tions about him and the law. The Irishman’s opinion of English jurispru-
dence is, for example, complex and not wholly complimentary. Especially
in his early pre-political writings, Burke’s jurisprudential asides presented
a challenge to ‘vulgar whiggism’ and insular English and common law
histories. His parliamentary statements also suggest that he emphasised the
centrality of the legislature rather than, as is often suggested, the courts of
common law. Perhaps most importantly, Burke’s frequent use of legal
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terms – contract, partnership, prescription, rights – is largely rhetorical,
built on his wider understanding of morals, manners, and history.
? ? ?
As there was then no place for legal training in his native Ireland, Burke
left to study law at London’s Middle Temple at the goading of his father,
himself a lawyer with the High Court of the Exchequer. The younger Burke
did not take immediately to his studies. He flirted with the idea of a literary
career before determining that he felt ‘comfort that tho a middling Poet
cannot be endured there is some quarter for a Middling Lawyer’.3 As it
turned out, Burke left his legal studies without entering the bar. He began
instead a writing career. In 1756, he published A vindication of natural
society, parodying Lord Bolingbroke, the ‘country’ tory historian and deist.
1757 saw publication of A philosophical enquiry into the origins of our
ideas of the sublime and beautiful, an empiricist aesthetics providing, in
effect, a ‘natural’ foundation for ‘artificial’ society. The same year, there
appeared Burke’s collaboration – with William Burke, a friend he met at
the Middle Temple – on An Account of the European settlements in
America, a comparative history and ethnography of the new world.
Elements of Burke’s thought are consistent with the ‘common law mind’,
the corporate, cumulative development of law over time. But there were
similar, equally important sources – the culture of politeness, latitudinari-
anism, civic thought, and comparative and philosophical histories – that
Burke imbibed long before his legal studies. The progressive ‘wisdom of
the ages’ was inherent in contemporary empiricism and what he called, in
the Enquiry, a ‘more extended and perfect induction’.4 This resembles the
adjudicative growth of common law, but has as much to do with the corpo-
rate growth of science. Here as elsewhere, abstract ideas and general prin-
ciples played a guiding though falsifiable role, without which ‘all
reasonings … would be only a confused jumble of particular facts and
details’.5 This is not, however, the simple induction of principles from
3 Burke, E. The correspondence of Edmund Burke, 10 vols., Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 1981-, T.W. Copeland (gen. ed.), i.111.
4 Burke, E. A philosophical enquiry into the origins of our ideas of the sublime and the beautiful,
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1990 [1756], 4.
5 Burke, E. The works and correspondence of the Right Honourable Edmund Burke, 8 vols., Lon-
don, Francis and John Rivington, 1852, vi.101.
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particular cases. Such principles, broader than the rules or rights of law and
more flexible to circumstance, were one of the defining features of Euro-
pean, especially continental, jurisprudence.
Burke developed deep reservations about the narrowness of the legal
training of the day and the quality of the public men it produced. Legal
education amounted then to little more than attendance in the courts of
Westminister and dining with practicing attorneys. It was, he later wrote, a
‘narrow and inglorious study’.6 A graduate of the University of Dublin’s
Trinity College, Burke emphasized instead the importance of a liberal
education for those entering the law. In this, at least, he appears to have been
in agreement with William Blackstone, whose A discourse on the study of
the law (1758) made a similar point. As editor and contributor to the Annual
Register, Burke actually appears to have reviewed the Discourse. He
thought it a ‘solid judicious and elegant oration … for putting the study of
[law] under proper regulations, and spirited persuasive to make that study
so regulated, a considerable part of academic education’.7 The Discourse
served as Blackstone’s introduction to his Oxford lectures in 1758, the first
in the English common law, and his subsequent Commentaries on the laws
of England (1765-9). For Burke, an enlightened jurisprudence had to go
beyond law, both pedagogically and philosophically.
By the late 1750s, in addition to his successful publications, Burke had
begun to develop a rich web of friendships with many of the leading intel-
lects and artists of the age. This included, for example, both Samuel
Johnson and James Boswell in the ‘Literary Club’. The former secretly
assisted Robert Chambers, Blackstone’s successor at Oxford, with his law
lectures; the latter was trained as a Scottish advocate. Far more important
for understanding Burke’s thoughts on law and legal theory, he wrote, but
never published, two important works on history and law in the late 1750s
and early 1760s. An Abridgement of the English history (c1757-62),
completed through the Magna Charta, and a short fragment on English law
(c1757) may be the most informative of his texts.8 Both show him deeply
6 Burke, E. The writings and speeches of Edmund Burke (10 vols), P Langford (gen. ed.), Oxford,
Oxford University Press, 1997-, i.323. See Burke, Correspondence i.111.
7 Annual Register, 1758, 452, 452.
8 These are included as ‘Fragment. – An essay towards an history of the law of England’ and An
Essay towards an Abridgement of the English history in Writings and speeches, i.322-31 and
i.332-552.
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critical of English exceptionalism and insularity. Whatever the virtues of
early England, the Saxons were a ‘rude and barbarous people’ – a trope
long in use with the Irish – whose ‘liberty’ was license and anarchy.9 In a
climate that glorified the insular and immemorial nature of English law,
Burke wrote that
the present system of our laws, like our language and our learning, is a very
mixed and heterogeneous mass, in some respects on our own; in more
borrowed from the policy of foreign nations, and compounded, altered, and
variously modified, according to the various necessities which the manners,
the religion, and the commerce of the people have at different times
imposed …10
Against contemporary party histories, Burke highlighted English improve-
ment through its social commerce or ‘communication with the rest of
Europe’.11 It is important to note that Burke’s opinion appears solidly whig,
though not ‘whiggish’. His view was firmly rooted in the establishment
political whiggism of mid-century. These establishment whigs, like the
Rockingham whigs, were moderns. They sought to undermine the poten-
tially radical histories of tory writers who had themselves adopted the
‘vulgar whiggism’ of the ‘ancient constitution’. The country tory Henry St
John, lord Bolingbroke, the target of Burke’s Vindication, was thus also
among the most whiggish historians. Burke’s emphasis, with seventeenth-
century jurists like Robert Brady and John Selman, is instead on the degree
to which English law was European. Burke identified the ‘three capital
sources’ of legal influence as the ‘ancient traditionary customs of the
North’, the ‘Canons of the Church, and ‘some parts of the Roman civil
law’.12 In this and other ways, he is, contrary to superficial analysis of his
texts, at odds with Blackstone as well as the seventeenth-century English
jurist Matthew Hale.
By contrast to the ancients, the liberty of the ‘moderns’ came from the
increase of state powers, by the very distance of government from the
governed. It eroded the power of local nobility, contributed to the modern-
isation of many feudal holdovers and an increased social mobility, particu-
9 Writings and speeches, i.430.
10 Ibid., i.325.
11 Ibid., i.453.
12 Ibid., i.331.
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larly as offered by greater levels of social and financial commerce. In
jurisprudence, this is seen most clearly in the increasingly insistence on a
distinction between ‘perfect’ juridical-political duties (or rights) backed by
public sanctions and deemed indispensable for any constituent social order
and the ‘imperfect’ demands and institutions left over, the organs of benef-
icence (or benevolence). This was a change of some significance to social
thought. As an important source of self-understanding, the increased
universalism of the state suggested a more subjective and autonomous,
indeed legalistic, concept of the individual. By these developments, those
social practices and institutions remaining outside the state were thrown
into relief. Laws, with their attendant sanctions, were increasingly distin-
guished from manners and norms. The growing strength of commerce as a
‘power’ independent of the state only strengthened this tendency.
Where Blackstone, a ‘whiggish’ tory, blamed the Normans for the corrup-
tion of English liberty, Burke saw the conquest as joining England with the
wider progress of society in Europe. The Irishman was specifically critical
of Hale for failing to note ‘the great changes and remarkable revolutions in
the law’ over time and for fostering the idea that it was simply ‘formed and
grew up among ourselves’.13 Burke’s account was also not a mere jurispru-
dential history. With the Scots, he maintained that ‘the changes, … in the
manners, opinions, and sciences of men … [are] as worthy of regard as the
fortunes of wars, and the revolutions of kingdoms’.14 Linked to European
manners, Burke saw the development of English, and European, law as
progressive. ‘What can be more instructive’, he wrote:
than to search out the first obscure and scanty fountains of that jurispru-
dence which now waters and enriches whole nations with so abundant and
copious a flood – to observe the first principles of RIGHT springing up,
involved in superstition and polluted with violence, until at length of time
and favourable circumstances it has worked itself into clearness. The Laws
sometimes lost and trodden down in the confusion of wars and tumults, and
sometimes overruled by the hand of power; then, victorious over tyranny,
growing stronger, clearer, and more decisive by the violence they had
suffered; enriched even by those foreign conquests, which threatened their
entire destruction; softened and mellowed by peace and Religion; improved
13 Ibid., i.323, 323.
14 Ibid., i.358.
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and exalted by commerce, by social intercourse, and that great opener of the
mind, ingenious science?15
Burke’s modern, evolutionary and progressive view was very different
from that of many of his contemporaries. Even Montesquieu, ‘the greatest
genius, which has enlightened this age’, was not above criticism in the
texts.16 Burke suggested, too, that history and the historical method was an
important element in a liberal education. The same idea was strongly advo-
cated in Henry Home, lord Kames’ Historical law tracts (1758) in this
period. Burke was, in fact, familiar with a number of leading Scottish
jurists and thinkers, including: Lord Hailes, Hume, James Mackintosh,
John Millar, and Adam Smith. Between them, Burke and the Scots exem-
plified the most pressing debates and developments of the century.
Burke also spent time in Ireland in the early 1760s, leading to the produc-
tion of additional texts that shed light on his thoughts on jurisprudence.
Much of his time was spent, however, engaged with more practical and
sectarian politics. Burke was active in quieting the reaction of the Dublin
government, dominated by the established church, to the so-called
‘Whiteboy disturbances’. These agrarian disturbances, mischaracterised as
confessional, implicated his own catholic relatives. Burke was, in fact,
nowhere more critical of the laws of Britain and Ireland than in his Tracts
relating to [the] popery laws (c1765) written in the same period. There, he
recognised the virtues of a more ‘regular, consistent, and stable jurispru-
dence’ were real, a mark of legal progress and foundation for social polite-
ness.17 But the abuse of Irish Catholics by means of law struck him as
particularly perverse. These Irish experiences are important to under-
standing much of his thought. This experience of the dispersal and destruc-
tion of a traditional aristocracy, of confiscations based on cultural and
religious status, was a pattern Burke later saw repeated in British India and
the revolution in France. We can also see his concern for the implications
of legal and constitutional change. Legal reform was not easy ‘because
laws, like houses, lean on one another, and the operation is delicate, and
should be necessary’.18 Still, echoing Montesqueiu, he wrote that
15 Ibid., i.322.
16 Ibid., i.445.
17 Ibid., i.330.
18 Ibid., ix.453.
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The Legislature of Ireland, like all Legislatures, ought to frame its Laws to
suit the people and the circumstances of the Country, and not any longer to
make it their business to force the nature, the temper, and the inveterate
habits of a Nation to a conformity to speculative systems concerning any
kind of Laws. Ireland has an established Government, and a Religion
legally established, which are to be preserved. It has a people who are to be
preserved too, and to be led by reason, principle, sentiment, and interest to
acquiesce in that Government.19
The Tracts also noted the necessity of an ‘interior history of Ireland’ which
would show that Irish grievances were ‘not produced by toleration, but by
persecution’ and ‘from unparalleled oppression.’20 Burke spent consider-
able time over the next four decades trying to ensure that such histories
were written. Most of his allies in this were Irish catholic historians. It was
often Irish manners, they all insisted, that carried the nation through the
barbarous application of English law in Ireland. Burke also donated histor-
ical documents to Trinity and persuaded others to do the same. Francis
Stoughton Sullivan, the first professor of common law at the University of
Dublin, was one recipient. Sullivan, at Burke’s urging, sought to translate
ancient Brehon law texts. And while Burke shared Hume’s skepticism
towards England’s ‘ancient constitution’, he saw the Scot uncritically
repeating the more offensive and prejudicial portrayals of Ireland. Burke
sought unsuccessfully, with Tobias Smollet and Irish catholic historians, to
persuade Hume to reconsider and rewrite his account.
Without appreciating these early texts and contexts, as well as Burke’s rich
rhetoric, the meaning of his later works may be distorted. In the Reflections,
for example, Burke wrote that English jurists from ‘[Lord Edward] Coke
… to Blackstone, are industrious to prove the pedigree of our liberties….’,
adding that ‘if the lawyers mistake the particulars, it proves my position
still the more strongly; because it demonstrates the powerful prepossession
towards antiquity’.21 We can see, however, from these early writings that
Burke believed Coke and Blackstone had, with Hale and others, mistaken
the particulars. When he observed that the English insisted on the conti-
nuity of their institutions, Burke did not maintain the truth of those claims.
19 Ibid., ix.650.
20 Ibid., ix.479, 479.
21 Ibid., viii.81-2.
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The appeal to the past created a useful continuity necessary for the progress
of society in Europe. But it still remained myth, a point the Irishman would
not forget. At its best, the appeal to history was, he said in the Reflections,
to be ‘guided not by the superstition of antiquarians, but by the spirit of
philosophical analogy’.22 Aware of the virtues of the British constitution, a
belief widespread in Europe, Burke was equally aware of its vices, espe-
cially in Ireland, America, and India. And, as will be discussed below,
comments of this sort were not a defence of common law adjudication
against legislation, but of the British constitution against revolutionary
radicalism.
Attempts by critics to link Burke with the so-called ‘Historical School’ of
jurisprudence of the nineteenth century are also problematic. His influence
on German thought is genuine, but simplistically equating his eighteenth-
century hostility towards radical revolution with the opposition, especially
by Frederick von Savigny, to the nineteenth-century codification of laws is
quite seriously misplaced. Like Burke, Savigny emphasised the importance
of the past to his present. Both were deeply critical of philosophical ration-
alism. But Savigny replaced reason with the mystical Volksgeist, the ‘spirit
of the nation or people’ linking law and the people. The ‘Historical School’
was, in fact, linked to the insular nationalism of the nineteenth century and
the hope for the creation of a German state. With Montesquieu and others,
Burke recognised general differences in national character and culture, but
these were extraordinarily fluid. European progress, in both manners and
laws, was the result of the ‘communication’ or interaction of cultures. In
the end, the Volksgeist resembles nothing so much as the Saxon ‘spirit’ of
vulgar English whiggism. The often rowdy amalgamation of English and
Celts, protestants and catholics, whigs and tories, that Burke sought to
harmonise as a legislator bore little resemblance to such images. This
attempt to recruit Burke to later English hostility is, of course, only one of
many anachronistic errors made in wrenching Burke’s texts out of their
contexts.
? ? ?
22 Ibid., viii.84.
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Not long after returning to England in the 1760s, Burke was working as
personal secretary for Charles Watson Wentworth, Lord Rockingham.
Shortly afterwards, he entered Parliament himself. For nearly twenty years,
Burke would serve as the chief ideological spokesman of the Rockingham
whigs. The commercial humanism they sought to maintain was a serious
attempt at joining public honour and private interest, balancing the stability
and corporate experience of a hereditary aristocracy with the energy and
ambition of a ‘natural’ aristocracy. They were especially critical of crown
influence and remained anxious, with their whig predecessors, about colo-
nialism and ‘standing armies’. These long-standing civic languages of
critique are very different from the legalist and liberal vocabulary that
would come to dominant politics after the revolution in France. The latter
have little application to Burke’s parliamentary career. Indeed, the reac-
tionary nature of much contemporary populism, perhaps particularly in
anti-catholic riots in Britain, is especially important to understanding
Burke’s later responses to British radicalism and European revolution. At
its best, Burke saw Parliament, as a body, independent of the vagaries of
public opinion and the influence of the crown. He spent much of his career
engaged in modest, meliorist reform. Best-known was his unsuccessful
economic reforms designed to eliminate feudal holdovers and to reduce
crown influence. But he championed religious tolerance, spoke against
slavery, and was critical of many of the more Draconian aspects of contem-
porary criminal law. The ‘true genius’ of the British constitution, Burke
once confided to Boswell, was ‘Tory Language and Whigg [sic]
measure’.23
Burke’s views on the primacy of the legislature also appear to put him at
odds with William Murray, lord Mansfield, with whom he is often associ-
ated. While Burke no doubt respected Mansfield’s abilities, and the judge
was related to Rockingham, the two disagreed on a number of public
issues, not least the American war. Mansfield also jailed John Wilkes who
was supported by the Rockingham whigs. Perhaps most damning for
Burke, Mansfield was, like Blackstone, a tory and was linked to John
Stuart, lord Bute. Without descending to the anti-Scottish tirades of fellow
whigs, Burke criticised Bute’s influence on the king (as well as the king’s
on parliament). For his part, Mansfield suspected Burke to be the author of
23 Burke, Correspondence, v.35.
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Junius’ Letters (1768-72), critical of him and around which another debate
on libel arose. Indeed, while the former is credited with creating significant
change in English law through the courts, the latter saw legislators rather
than judges as the proper agents of legal reform. Given his parliamentary
career, this is hardly surprising.
When Mansfield was denying the jury a role in determining questions of
law, Burke wrote:
I have always understood, that a superintendence over the doctrines as well
as the proceedings of the courts of justice, was a principal object of the
constitution of this House; that you were to watch at once over the lawyer
and the law; that there should be an orthodox faith as well as proper works:
and I have always looked with a degree of reverence and admiration on this
mode of superintendence. For being totally disengaged from the detail of
juridical practice, we come something perhaps the better qualified, and
certainly much the better disposed, to assert the genuine principle of the
laws; in which we can, as a body, have no other than an enlarged and a
public interest.24
The difficult duty of articulating the law – in light of general principles on
one hand and the practical limits of local manners on the other – was, in
large part, the responsibility of the corporate legislature. Parliament repre-
sented, at least ‘virtually’ and ideally, the public virtue of Britain in a way
that the courts could not. In the jury debates, Burke stated
Juries ought to take their Law from the Bench only; but it is our Business
that they should hear nothing from the Bench but what is agreeable to the
principles of the constitution. The Jury are to hear the Judge; the Judge is
to hear the Law where it speaks plain, where it does not he is to hear the
Legislator.25
Neither English courts nor parliament were alone responsible for institu-
tions like the jury. A development ‘so elaborate and artificial as the Jury
was … brought to its present state by the joint efforts of Legislative
24 Works, ii. 137 (taken from the draft of the ‘Speech on the Jury Bill’ in Ibid., 137-46). Cf. Writings
and speeches, ii.343-9, which contains only that part of the speech given, and from which those
citations are taken.
25 Writings and speeches, ii.347.
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authority and judicial prudence.’26 Burke would also continue to empha-
sise the civic commonplace that it was the rule of men, especially the public
virtue of public men, on which justice depended.
Burke’s best-known opinion at this stage of his career was his strong oppo-
sition to the American war. In debates of the period, he articulated his rejec-
tion of legalistic formalism and declarations of abstract right. His
objections were both philosophical and political. During the American
Revolution, Burke chastised the English Parliament’s insistence on its
formal, theoretical privileges. As with Ireland, what was essential for him
were ties of mutual interest and affection. After Rockingham’s death in
1782, radical whigs became more vocal in their demands for extensive
constitutional innovations, particularly in representation. British radicals,
including religious Dissenters, were also critical to the losses of the Rock-
ingham whigs in the electoral debacle of 1784. The fourteen-year impeach-
ment of Warren Hastings found Burke arguing against any simplistic
imposition of British laws and manners on India. Instead, he defended
native civilisation and institutions.27 Burke also noted the ‘growing Melio-
ration of the Law’ that sought justice beyond legal formalism. The close
relationship of European culture and commerce ‘opened a Communication
more largely with other Countries, as the Law of Nature and Nations …
came to be cultivated; … antique Rigour and over-done Severity gave Way
to the Accommodation of Human Concerns, for which Rules were made,
and not Human Concerns to bend to them’.28
The uncertainty of succession in the ‘Regency crisis’ further exposed the
widening divisions over constitutional theory and history. The increasing
inflexibility of radical demands in ostensibly ‘natural’ rights, piqued
Burke’s hostility. For him, ‘abstract principles of natural right – which the
dissenters rested on, as their strong hold – were the most idle, because the
most useless and the most dangerous to resort to. They superceded society,
and broke asunder all those bonds which had formed the happiness of
mankind for ages’.29 They threatened, as the revolutionaries would in
France, civilisation itself. ‘Am I to congratulate an highwayman and
26 Ibid., ii.347.
27 Ibid., vii.168.
28 Ibid., vii.163.
29 Report of Mr Burke’s speech on 2 March 1790, in the debates on the ‘Test and corporation acts’
of 1790’ in The Parliamentary Register Vol. XXVII, (John Debrett, 1790), 178-187, 180.
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murderer, who has broke prison, upon the recovery of his natural rights?’30
His focus, he insisted, was instead on the ‘civil social man’, who in order
to ‘obtain justice … gives up his right of determining what it is in points
the most essential to him’.31 For Burke, natural law was expressed or
instantiated, however imperfectly, throughout history and a variety of legal
orders. But the clarity of claims of natural right were a ‘confusion of judi-
cial with civil principles’.32 They were epistemologically unsound and
ontologically denied the inherently communitarian nature of human asso-
ciation. Politically, they risked the progressive, precarious articulation of
political rights in European history
Burke’s doctrine of prescription, which may be seen descriptively as early
as the Abridgement, became a progressively more important normative
requirement in his attempt to pursue and maintain moderate reforms. If
Burke’s employment of ‘prescription’ is problematic, it is so because of its
absence of rules for application. The legal analogy had little to do with any
specific body of law. It may even be universal. Burke’s presumption in
favour of established rules and institutions was not uncritical. It was a
prudential consideration rooted, in part, on the essentially communal and
non-rational nature of human social life and the ‘natural’, ie naturalistic,
basis of human presumption, habituation, etc. This is related, too, to
Burke’s critical view, with most of his contemporaries, of any strict
doctrine of precedent. With his inherent philosophical-epistemological
scepticism towards ‘precepts’ and ‘rules’, Burke was always wary of rigid
legalism. He did not believe that legal precedent was a straightforward
matter. Such rationalism runs contrary to the whole tenor of Burke’s
thought. This should not be surprising. Nor was precedent, political or
legal, simply binding. The acceptance of modern stare decisis, in which a
single decision of a superior court is binding on inferior courts, is a product
of nineteenth-century positivism. Indeed, ‘[p]recedents merely as such
cannot make Law’, Burke wrote, ‘because then the very frequency of
Crimes would become an Argument of innocence.’33 Past decisions were
30 Burke, Reflections on the revolution in France and on the proceedings of certain societies in Lon-
don relative to that event, London, Penguin Books, 1968 [1790], C.C. O’Brien (ed.), 90.
31 Ibid., 150.
32 Works, iv.485.
33 Writings and speeches, ix.502.
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persuasive, as evidence of learned opinion of the law and a valuable source
of legal stability, but they were not authoritative in themselves.
? ? ?
It was in this context that Burke’s response to events in France must be
understood. As constitutional reform turned to cultural revolution, the
novelty and proselytising spirit of the revolution became ever more
apparent. Approached by Thomas Paine, Burke was taken aback by his
enthusiasm for an expanding European revolution. More immediately, a
published sermon of the Dissenter Richard Price to English sympathisers
of the revolution seemed to confirm a real threat to Britain. The Reflections
on the Revolution in France and on the proceedings in certain societies in
London relative to that event (1790) was largely aimed at this native audi-
ence. Paine and Price also seemed to confirm Burke’s belief in important
political and philosophical links between British religious radicalism and
French revolutionary thought. This revolutionary zeal appeared to him
little different from the religious enthusiasm of the British, Irish and Euro-
pean wars of the previous century. It was not progress Burke dreaded, but
the loss of the improvement that had already occurred in Europe over
centuries. Even before the Terror in France he feared
first of all the science of jurisprudence, the pride of the human intellect,
which, with all its defects, redundancies, and errors, is the collected reason
of the ages, combining the principles of original justice with the infinite
variety of human concerns, as a heap of old exploded errors, would no
longer be studied.34
Even manners might lose all anchor and the historical progress of society
in Europe endangered
No part of life would retain its acquisitions. Barbarism with regard to
science and literature, unskilfulness with regard to arts and manufactures,
would infallibly succeed to the want of a steady education and settled prin-
ciple; and thus the commonwealth itself would, in a few generations,
crumble away, be disconnected into the dust and powder of individuality,
and at length dispersed to all the winds of heaven.35
34 Reflections, 193-4.
35 Ibid., 193-4.
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A defender of the modernity of the ancien régimes, including his own,
Burke did not dread progress or change, but the loss of centuries of Euro-
pean civilisation and improvement. It was the slow, fragile development of
European manners that ultimately supported both commerce and the laws.
In the ‘shade’ of these manners, ‘commerce, and trade, and manufacture,
the gods of our oeconomical politicians, are themselves perhaps but crea-
tures; are themselves but effects, which, as first causes, we choose to
worship. … They too may decay with their natural protecting principles’.36
Burke’s essential concern was for the corporate, mediating, process by
which individual and popular will was balance by public reason.
In what may be his most famous passage, Burke wrote that ‘Society is,
indeed, a contract’.37 The passage, which follows shortly after that quoted
above, continues:
Subordinate contracts for objects of mere occasional interest may be
dissolved at pleasure; but the state ought not to be considered as nothing
better than a partnership agreement in a trade of pepper and coffee, calico
or tobacco, or some other such low concern, to be taken up for a little
temporary interest, and to be dissolved by the fancy of the parties. It is to
be looked on with other reverence; because it is not a partnership in things
subservient only to the gross animal existence of a temporary and perish-
able nature. It is a partnership in all science, a partnership in all art, a
partnership in every virtue and in all perfection. As the ends of such a
partnership cannot be obtained in many generations, it becomes a partner-
ship not only between those who are living, but between those who are
living, those whose are dead, and those who are to be born.38
But this extract shows, perhaps better than any, the mistake of applying to
Burke any narrowly political or jurisprudential reading. It suggests the
close connections between manners, history, and law. Burke’s point is
precisely to deny that the language of ‘contract’ is sufficient to under-
standing or articulating the complexities of human community and history.
For Burke, ‘society’, the civil or civilised society, was an entity wider than
state or nation. It was the felt sociability and lived associations of men,
36 Ibid., 173-4.
37 Ibid., 194-5.
38 Ibid., 194-5.
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plural and corporate, enveloping all social practices and institutions. While
these were based in natural human dispositions, they were not insignifi-
cantly altered by culture and historical circumstance. There are few points
more important in understanding Burkean jurisprudence than the recogni-
tion that he does not collapse ‘civil society’ into the state, but the state into
civilised society. The social practices and manners of a people, not least
their economic structures, influenced the character and content of their
laws and institutions. Modern legislators must be concerned with manners,
and the mediating orders and institutions that moderate them, precisely
because he may do so little to alter them.
Burke saw manners as both the source of the laws and practical limits to
their efficacy. And manners had, of course, ‘natural’ sources. For all of the
uniqueness of its mechanisms and sanctions, law was ultimately ‘benefi-
cence acting by a rule’.39 The modern and enlightened cultures of pre-revo-
lutionary Europe were historically progressive, as Burke saw it, precisely
because they balanced the inevitable development of relationships of status
with those of choice, including contract. This emphasis on manners and
beneficence, on nature and culture, is Burke’s most serious challenge to the
epistemological transparency and ontological subjectivism of the radical
enlightenment, both secular and religious. It puts him closer to thinkers of
the so-called ‘Scottish Enlightenment’ – and to Irish catholic historians –
than to common lawyers in ultimately prioritizing manners (or culture)
over law. Law was insufficient without beneficience, just as reason was
without sentiment. The ‘spirit of our Laws’ were founded on ‘our own
dispositions, which are stronger than Laws’.40 It is in this sense that
Manners are of more importance than laws. Upon them, in a great measure,
the laws depend. The law touches us but here and there, and now and then.
Manners are what vex or soothe, corrupt or purify, exalt or debase,
barbarize or refine us, by a constant, steady, uniform, insensible operation,
like that of the air we breathe in. They give their whole form and colour to
our lives. According to their quality, they aid morals, they supply them, or
they totally destroy them.41
39 Ibid., 149.
40 Burke, Letters on a regicide peace, Indianapolis, Librty Fund Press, 1999 [1795-7], 384.
41 Ibid., 126.
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Burke’s jurisprudence is imperfect, in both the general and eighteenth-
century senses. For better and worse, he argued that manners and history
continually reassert themselves in the face of a more perfect justice that
neglected manners, other norms, and the mediating practices and institu-
tions of society.
? ? ?
For Burke, the relationship of law, history, and manners was rooted in a
naturalism based in the dynamic empiricism of his age, the legacy of the
‘culture of politeness’, and religious latitudinarianism. What he called, in
the Reflections, the ‘moral constitution of the heart’, the formation of indi-
vidual character, was a sublime amalgamation of native predispositions
and cultural influence.42 It was on this ‘constitution’ that the history of
European manners and progress was built. In articulating such a view,
Burke was working in parallel, if not actually in partnership, with many of
the most sophisticated historians and jurists of the day. A ‘civil economy’
of glory, he believed, continued to provide the social stability necessary for
improvement and a link between private and public interest. A commercial
humanism provided energy and ambition for social change and ‘communi-
cation’. Here as elsewhere, the ‘civic’ traditions, ancient and modern, leav-
ened Burke’s faith in commerce and law. Finally, general principles of
natural justice, with none of the clarity of revolutionary rights, continued
to guide legislators. In the final analysis, law was itself only a highly
formal, though critical, method of ensuring public virtue and private benef-
icence in light of manners and history.
Among the materials in the Burke archives is what appears to be a draft
defence of his later, anti-revolutionary writings. There he wrote:
For the future, I shall stick to my profession. We lawyers do not always
make the best hand of a Metaphor. I have burned my fingers with them. In
future, I shall avoid all metaphors – I shall stick to my precedent Book …
& my special Pleading … Oh. Si sic omnia!43
42 Reflections, 176.
43 F (M) A.xiv.12a-d in the Fitzwilliam (Milton) Burke Collection at the Northampton Record
Office.
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Burke made considerable and colourful use of legal metaphor throughout
his life. We must be careful not to burn our fingers. Burke was not, of
course, always imprecise. His early comments on law very clearly show
him critical of insular English and common law histories that failed to
acknowledge their external debts to the wider progress of society in
Europe. While we must also be careful with his parliamentary statements,
issued in the midst of major public debates, he consistently insisted that
Parliament rather than courts should be at the centre of legal change. More
generally, reading his work as a whole suggests that, for Burke, positive
law was the imperfect application of natural principles significantly altered
by historical circumstance. His use – or misuse – of the language of law
was a rhetorical strategy that served as a critique of the thin legalism of
revolutionary sloganeering. He defended the modernity of the old regimes,
with all of their imperfections, for fear of the loss of centuries of cumula-
tive, corporate progress. Readers, or at least scholars, must be more atten-
tive to these contexts and less determined to rescue Burke for contemporary
causes.
Oh, si sic omnia!
